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1 Introduction 
It is well known that the English auction has many desirable properties when a single object is to 
be sold. With private values, this auction implements the efficient allocation uniquely in weakly 
dominant strategies, and maximizes the seller's expected revenue within a large class of 'simple' 
selling procedures (Lopomo (11]). However, the properties of generalized versions of the English 
auction in situations in which many objects are to be sold, and the buyers have use for more than 
one object, are yet to be fully understood. 
By and large, most of the existing work on simultaneous multiple objects auctions has focused 
on the case with nonincreasing marginal willingness to pay in the bidders' utility function. Most 
closely related to the present paper in terms of the auction rules, Milgrom [141 has analyzed the 
"simultaneous ascending auctions," which have been used by the US government to sell licenses for 
the use of radio frequency bands. Mostly under the hypothesis that the bidders' utility functions 
are common knowledge, Milgrom discusses issues surrounding the auction's performance in terms 
of its ability of generating efficient outcomes and its potential for maximizing the seller's expected 
revenue. In particular, he describes an equilibrium for the case of two bidders, two objects and no 
private information, that is similar to the one described in Proposition 1 of this paper: each bidder 
can buy one object for the minimum price allowed by the rules of the auction. 
Proposition 1 allows for private information but restricts the bidders' utility functions to be 
additive: i.e. each bidder's willingness to pay for each object is independent of whether she is 
also buying the other object. This result has also been established independently by Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Kahn [7J. They also establish the existence of other 'low revenue' equilibria, always 
for the case with two bidders, two objects and additive utility functions. 
Under a condition which rules out complementarities in the buyers' utility functions, Giil and 
Stacchetti [9J have studied a generalized version of the English auction akin to a tatonnement 
process, with emphasis on the relation between its equilibria and the Walrasian equilibria of the 
underlying economy: Ausubeland Cramton [lJ have also studied environments with nonincreasing 
marginal values, but have focused mostly on sealed-bid auctions. Recently, Kwasnica (101 has 
done experimental work on collusion in multiple object sealed-bid auctions, with additive utility 
functions.1 
Environments in which the bidders have increasing marginal valuations have been considered 
in Chakraborty (4], who has studied properties of various sealed-bid auctions formats. His paper 
lThe possibility of collusion in auctions has also been studied extensively in the single object case. (See Campbell 
[3], Graham and Marshall [8], Mailath and Zemsky [121, McAfee and McMillan [151 and Pesendorfer [17].) Caillaud 




also contains a good survey of existing work on L,lultiple object auctions. 
In this paper we examine the claim that generalized English auctions can be more vulnerable 
to collusion in the multiple objects case than in the single object case. Concerns about collusive 
behavior of bidders have emerged, for example, in an article published in The Economist (1997). 
Most recently, Cramton and Schwartz [5J have indicated evidence of collusive behavior in the FCC 
spectrum auctions, and discussed the effectiveness of various modifications of the auction rules in 
hindering bidders' collusion. 
In particular, the following conjectures are usually held about auctions with multiple objects: 
• The presence of multiple objects facilitates collusion by allowing the bidders to signal their 
willingness to abstain from competing over certain objects, provided they are not challenged 
on others. In this way, the agents can allocate the objects among themselves without paying 
much. 
• As the ratio of bidders to objects increases, the possibility of collusive schemes as the ones 
indicated in the previous conjecture tends to disappear. 
• High complementarities among objects hinder collusion. This is because each bidder is less 
satisfied with owning only a subset of the objects on sale; she has therefore an incentive to 
break the collusion and compete for all the objects in order to fully realize the synergies. 
We study how the signalling opportunities provided by the sequential nature of open ascending 
auctions can be exploited by the bidders in the presence of multiple objects to coordinate on 
equilibria which generate low revenue for the seller and implement socially inefficient allocations of 
the objects. For simplicity, we focus on the case of two objects, although the results carry over to 
the case with any number of objects. 
The model is described. in section 2. In section 3 we begin the analysis with the benchmark 
case of purely additive values, i.e. we assume that each bidder obtains no synergies from owning 
multiple objects, hence her willingness to pay for' one object is independent of whether she is also 
buying other objects. We present conditions under which coIiusion-via-signaling can be sustained 
in equilibrium. Equilibria in this class can be described for the simple case with only two bidders 
as follows. Each bidder starts by placing the smallest possible bid on her most valued object, 
and no bJd on the other object. If only one bid is placed on each object, it becomes common 
knowledge that the bidders rank the objects differently, and the bidders simply confirm their bids 
in the next round thus forcing the auction to end with each buying one object for the minimum 
price. If, instead, the initial bids reveal that the two bidders have a higher value for the same 
object, then the bidding continues according to some equilibrium strategy, which can entail, for 
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example, a reversion to "bidding straightforwardly," i.e. raising the bid on each object if the value 
is higher that the current highest bid and the bidder is not assigned the object.2 Alternatively, the 
bidders may continue bidding according to some other continuation strategy in which they proceed 
to signal more detailed information about their values in order to coordinate with each other and 
buy only one object each for a relatively low price. In all equilibria of this kind, the outcome is 
socially inefficient - i.e. the objects are not always assigned in a way that maximizes the total 
bidders' willingness to pay - but the bidders end up paying less than they would by bidding 
straightforwardly throughout the entire auction. And it turns out that the reduced payments make 
up for the loss of efficiency in assigning the objects, so that the each bidder's interim expected 
surplus is increased. 
We also show however that, for these equilibria, the probability that the bidders can collude 
via signaling decreases as their number increases relative to the number of objects. This result 
corroborates the conjecture that collusion is a 'low numbers' phenomenon. 
In section 4 we consider the case in which the bidders' utility functions exhibit large complemen-
tarities, i.e. their willingness to pay for the two objects together is much greater than the sum of the 
two objects's "stand e.lone" values. We show that. t~e sole presence of complementarities does not 
hinder collusion: the bidders can still manage to buy one object each, at low prices. In fact, in the 
extreme case in which the synergies are commonly known, and not too different across the bidders, 
the incentive structure for the bidders is essentially identical to the case with no complementarities. 
The efficiency loss however is much larger because it includes the unrealized complementarities. 
When complementarities are not-only large but also variable however, the possibility of collusion 
is seriously reduced. This suggests that what is crucial in determining the likelihood of collusion 
is not whether the complementarities are (on average) 'large', but more how variable they are. 
Section 5 contains concluding remarks, and an appendix collects all the proofs. 
2 The Model 
There are a set N = {I, ... ,n} of bidders and a set M = {l, ... ,m} of objects, with m,n finite. The 
bidders have quasi-"!.iu~ar utility functions, and t!lC willingness to pay of bidder i E N for bundle 
J c M is given by 'Ui (J). Bidder i knows her values {'Ui (J)} JE2M , while the rest of the world only 
knows t~at such values are drawn according to a probability function with support on a compact 
subset of ~r . 
The m objects are sold with an open ascending auction, named here the Generalized English 
2The use of the expression "bidding straightforwardly" to denote a strategy that is similar to the standard strategy 
in the one-object English auction is due to Milgrom [14). 
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Auction. or GEA, which is a natural extension of the standard one-object English auction to 
environments with multiple objects. The auction proceeds in rounds. At the initial round each 
bidder i submits a vector of bids (bI (1), ... bi (1)), where at (1) denotes the amount that bidder 
i declares she is p"~epared to pay for object j at round 1. The case in which bidder i places 
no bid on object j is treated setting of (1) = 0, and the minimum effective bid is normalized to 
zero. The auction ends with the seller keeping all objects if and only if each bidder places no 
bid on any object, Le. if bI (1) = 0 for each j E M, i E N. Otherwise, both the highest bid 
bi (1) := maxi b{ (1) (0 = -00 by convention) and a potential winner among the bidders who have 
offered bi (1) are identified for each object j E M, and the auction moves to round 2. At round 
2, each bidder i submits a new vector of bids (bI (2) , ... bi (2)). We model the condition that 
previous bids cannot be withdrawn by requiring that (bI (2), ... bi (2)) 2: (bI (1), ... bi (1)) . The 
auction ends at stage 2 if no bidder revises her bid on any object, i.e. if bf" (2) = b{ (1) , all j E M, 
i E N. Otherwise a potential winner is selected again for each object j among all i such that 
b{ (2) = bi (2) := m~, b{, (2), and the auction moves to the next round. Proceeding in this fashion, 
if round t 2: 2 is reached, and if at (t) = at (t - 1) for all j E M and i E N, then the auction ends, 
and each object j is assigned to the buyer selected at the end of round t - 1 among all i such that 
b{ (t -1) = bi (t - 1) ,:r= m~' b{, (t -1). The selected buyer pays his last bid bi (t -1) = bi (t). 
To keep the analysis and the notation as simple as possible, we establish our main results for 
the case m = 2, i.e. only two objects on sale. The main insights however apply to the more general 
case. We define: 
• Vi := Ui ({1}), the value to bidder i of having object 1 only; 
• Wi := Ui ({2}) , the value to bidder i of having object 2 only. 
We will use interchangeably the terms 'object V' (object w) and 'object l' (object 2). With only 
two objects, a bid by agent i in round t is just an ordered pair (bl (t), b; (t)). 
Finally, we assume that the size of the complementarity is independent of the two objects' 
'stand-alone' values, Le. the value to bidder i of having both objects is 
For each i E N, the values (Vi, Wi, ki ) are drawn from a joint probability distribution with density 
h (Vi, Wi, kj) and support [0,lJ2 x K. We assume that Vi and Wi are independent and identically 
distributed. Thus, Vi and Wi have identical marginal distribution, whose density and c.dJ. we 
denote by f and F respectively. The marginal distribution of k;. is either degenerate on 0, or is 
represented by a density 9 (and c.d.f. G) with support over the interval [hi, 'k] with k > 0. The 
values (Vi, Wi, ki) are drawn independently of (Vj, Wj, kj) for each j =I i. 
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In the next section we examine the case with no complementarities, i.e. ~ = 0 for all i E N. 
Section 4 will be devoted to the case with positive complementarities. 
3 Collusive Equilibria with No Complementarities 
In this section we consider the case of purely additive values 
or no complementarities, ki = 0 for each i. In this case there is really no point in terms of social 
efficiency in auctioning the objects simultaneously, since the efficient allocation of each object is 
independent of the allocation of the other objects. A sequence of single-object English auctions 
would allocate each object to the bidder with the highest value. However, the analysis of the 
bidders' equilibrium behavior in the GEA will provide a useful benchmark for the more realistic 
case in which complementarities are present. In particular, the purely additive case will shed light 
on the role played by multiple objects in facilitating collusion among the bidders. 
We begin with the following simple but important observation: with no complementarities, 
it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the GEA that each bidder i follow a 'Separated English 
Auctions' strategy (SEA), bidding on each object j until the price reaches the value Ui ({j}). It 
is clear that, if all other agents are following this strategy, then player i's best reply is to follow 
the same strategy3. Note that the SEA strategies are weakly dominant, hence optimal for each 
bidder independent of her beliefs about her opponent's values. We state the result for an arbitrary 
number of objects in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 0 With no complementarities, for any n and m, the separated English auctions strat-
egy (SEA) profile form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with some consistent belief system) after 
any history in the Generalized English auction. 
The SEA strategy profile can be used in the same way as Pareto inferior equilibria are used in 
repeated games to support collusive outcomes. They constitute the threat used to deter the bidders 
from using aggressive bidding strategies. 
The next observation is an immediate implication of the well-known Revenue Equivalence Theo-
rem (Myerson [16]). Since the bidder's types are drawn from independent probability distributions, 
by incentive compatibility the SEA equilibrium is the unique PBE which implements the socially 
efficient allocation. The incentive compatibility constraints pin down the interim expected pay-
ment function of each bidder for any given objects' allocation rule. Therefore, in any equilibrium 
3It is worth pointing out here that this argument would fail in the presence of complementarities. 
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of any trading game with no complementarities which implements the socially efficient allocation 
the buyers' interim expected payments must be equal to the sum of the expected payments in m 
separate standard English auctions. This also implies that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of 
the GEA in which all bidders are better off than in the SEA equilibrium the objects cannot be 
allocated according to the socially efficient rule. 
3.1 Two Bidders 
We begin with the case in which there are only two bidders. Proposition 1 establishes the existence 
of a symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium which dominates the SEA in terms of buyers's interim 
expected surplusi. Recall that F is the common marginal c.dJ. of Vi and Wi. 
Proposition 1 Suppose that E (x) == f01 x dF (x) ~ ~. Then the following strategy, together with 
some consistent belief system, form a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium: 
• Types (Vi, Wi) such that Vi ~ Wi open with (bl (1), bt (1)) = (0,0); 
• Type (Vi, Wi) such that Vi < Wi open with (bI (1), bt (1)) = (0,0); 
• If the initial bids are different, all types confirm their bid in round 2. 
• If at any round the bids differ from the ones given above, all types revert to the SEA strategy 
described in Proposition O. 
This equilibrium can be described as follows. Each bidder opens by making the minimum bid (zero) 
only on her most preferred object. If, at the end of the first round, the bidders discover that they 
rank the objects differently, then they stop bidding, and each is able to buy her preferred object at 
the lowest possible price. If instead they discover that they rank the two objects in the same way, 
then they revert to the Separated English Auctions strategies. The condition E (x) ~ ~ guarantees 
that, for each type of each bidder, the expected surplus from triggering the SEA strategies after an 
opening with different bids is lower than the surplus obtained by buying just her most preferred 
object for the minimum price. 
In the next subsection, we show that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the G EA contains 
other, "more collusive" equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which the bidders end up with a higher interim 
expected surplus. 
"The existence of this equilibrium has been established independently by Englelbredlt-Wiggans and Kahn [7]. 
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3.2 Getting More out of Collusion 
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 prescribe that the bidders revert to the SEA strategies 
when they open with the same bids, i.e. when it becomes common knowledge that their preferred 
object is the same. It is thus natural to ask whether in this case the bidders can do better by trying 
again to coordinate themselves and buy one object each at relatively low prices. The affirmative 
answer to this question is provided by the next proposition. 
Proposition 2 Let x, y be two independent random variables with c.d.! F. Assume that, for each 
a E [0,1], the following inequalities hold: 
E[xl O~x~ 1-aJ+E[xl a~x ~ 1] ~ 1, (1) 
E [x I x ~ a + y, 1 - a ~ yJ + E [x I y - a ~ x ~ 0, y ~ a] ~ 1. (2) 
Then the following strategy, together with some consistent belief system, form a symmetric perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium: 
First round: 
• Types (Vi,Wi) such that Vi ~ Wi open with (bl (l) ,b; (1)) = (0,0); 
• Types (Vi, wd such that Vi < Wi open with (bt(l) , br (1)) = (0,0) . 
Subsequent rounds: 
• If the initial bids are either «0,0), (0, 0)) or «0,0), (0,0)) then all types confirm their 
bids; 
• If the initial bids are «0,0), (0,0)) , then types (Vi, Wi) such that Vi -Wi = ai keep raising 
their bid on object V while refraining from bidding on W until either i) the opponent 
stops, or ii) the bid reach the value ai. In case i), they do not revise any bid for the next 
two rounds;and in case ii) they bid (ai, 0), for two consecutive rounds, thus moving the 
outstanding bid on W from 0 to O. If the initial bids are «0,0), (0, 0)), the strategy -is 
symmetric, with the roles of V and W switched. 
Out-o f-eq'l.Lilibrium paths: 
• If at any round a bid not -in accordance to the above described strategy is observed, then 
each type reverts to the SEA strategy. 
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The equilibrium formally stated in Proposition 2 can be described as follows. The bidders open 
by signalling which object they prefer. If they prefer different objects, then the game ends, as in 
the equilibrium of Proposition 1. If they prefer the same object, say v, then they keep raising the 
price on v while abstaining from competing on w, with bidder i prepared to bid up to the difference 
between her two values ai = Vi - Wi. Therefore, if ai > a3-i, then bidder i ends up buying object v 
at a price equal to the difference between her opponent's values a3-i. Her opponent stops competing 
on v when the price reaches a3-i, and buys W for the minimum bid. 
In this equilibrium, each bidder's type set [0, 1J2 is partitioned into lines with slope 1: types on 
the same line - i.e. with the same difference between the two objects' values - behave identically 
hence remain indistinguishable until the end of the auction. Given the pooling of low and high 
types, conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that the bidders have no incentive to trigger the SEA 
strategies at any round. 
It is worth noting that the bidders' behavior is robust to perturbations in their beliefs about 
their opponents' values; that is, if the postulated types' distribution F is such that conditions (1) 
and (2) hold as strict inequalities, then each bidder has no incentive to deviate at any round even if 
her beliefs are only approximately described by F. The equilibrium however relies on the fact that 
no object is assigned before the end of the auction, hence any object can still be bought after many 
rounds in which its outstanding bid has not moved. This may suggest that collusion-via-signaling 
can be destroyed by simply introducing an "activity rule", i.e. a condition specifying that any 
object whose price does not increase by at least a certain amount every given number of rounds 
be assigned to a bidder who has made the highest bid. But these minimum increments, which are 
effective only if sufficiently large, also work against allocative efficiency: they may prevent a buyer 
from getting an object when she has the highest value and her opponent's value is not too small. 
Moreover, even severe activity rules cannot eliminate all collusive equilibria. In particular, we 
can construct an equilibrium in which the objects are allocated exactly as in Proposition 2 -
hence by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem the bidders' expected payments must also be as in 
Proposition 2 - and the auction lasts at most three rounds: if the bidders open signaling that they 
both prefer the same object, say v, in the second round each places a bid on v equal to the expected 
difference between h~~ opponent's values; and in the third round, the lowest bidder buys w for the 
minimum price. The competition phase on v is thus compressed in just one round, the second 
one, in which each bidder signals the difference among her values by jumping to the corresponding 
bid on v. -This equilibrium cannot be destroyed by any rule which allows at least two rounds of 
inactivity before closing the bidding on an object. 
If any positive weight is given to the seller's surplus, the outcome of this equilibrium is Pareto 
inferior even to the one generated by the equilibrium of Proposition 1. Social efficiency requires 
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that each object be assigned to the agent who values it most, and this is what happens when the 
SEA strategies are triggered. In the equilibrium of Proposition 2 the SEA strategies are never 
triggered. 
Conditions (1) and (2) imply E (x) ~ ~, since the latter is obtained setting a = ° in (1). The 
two conditions are satisfied, for example, by the uniform distribution over [0,11. 
3.3 More than Two Bidders 
The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 may seem to rely heavily on the fact that the 
number of bidders is equal to the number of objects. However, some degree of collusion is still 
possible when there are more bidders than objects. The basic idea is that the bidders can follow the 
SEA strategy until only 2 players are left, and then adopt the strategies described in Propositions 
1 or 2 to divide the objects. 
Proposition 3 If there are n > 2 bidders and the c.d.f. F(x) satisfies E [x Ix ~ zl ~ l~Z for each 
z E [0,11, then the following strategy, together with some consistent belief system, form a symmetric 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium: 
• Round 1: If Vj, ~ Wi, open with (0,0), otheru;ise open with (0,0); 
• Round t: if more than two bidders were active at round t - 1, all types use the SEA strategy, 
i.e. they increase their bid on each object if their value is higher than the current highest bid 
and they are not assigned the object. 
If at round t - 1 only i and j i= i were active, and bidder j opened with (0,0) 1 then types 
(Vi, Wi) such that Vi ~ Wi rise the bid on v only by a small amount. Types (Vi, Wi) such that 
Vi $ Wi use symmetric strategy if j opened with (0,0). 
• If the observed history of bids is not obtained according to the strategies previously described 
then adopt the SEA strategy. 
A family of c.d.f.'s which satisfies the condition E[x Ix ~ zJ > ! (1 + z) for each z E [O,lJ is 
F (x) = xO , with a ~ 1. In this case we have: 
a 1- zO+l 
E(xlx > z) = -----
- a + 1 1- ZO 
and it can be checked that the inequality is satisfied for z E [0,1]. 
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 can also be extended to the case of n > 2 bidders. 
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Proposition 4 S1Lppose that there are n > 2 bidders and the c. d.f F is such that for each pair 
(a, z) such that z E [0, 1J and a E [0,1 - zJ the two following conditions are satisfied: 
E (x Iz s x S 1 - a) + E (x Iz + a S x SI) ;?: 1 + z (3) 
E (xl x ~ a + y, 1 - a ~ y ~ z) + E (xl y - a;?: x ~ z, y ;?: a + z) ~ 1 + z. (4) 
Then the following strategy is part of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium: Behave as in 
Proposition 3 except at the following point: 
• If at round t - 1 only you and another bidder were active then: 
• If Vi ;?: Wi and you opened with (0,0) while the other bidder opened with (0,0) then increase 
the bid on V and not on w, then stop. 
• If Vi < Wi and you opened with (0,0) while the other bidder opened with (0,0) then increase 
the bid on v and not on w, then stop. 
• If both players opened with (0,0) and z was the last offer for both objects then increase the 
bid on v up to z + ai, while keeping the offer for w at z. If the other bidders offers more than 
z + ai then get w for z. Otherwise, get v at the price at which competition ends, and leave w 
to the other bidder. 
This equilibrium works as the one of Proposition (3): the bidders start signalling which object 
they prefer and then push up both prices until only two players are left. The difference is that at 
that point the same strategies as in Proposition (2) are used: if bidders have opened showing that 
they rank the two objects in the same way, then they compete only on the top ranked object. The 
stopping point for each players is z + ai, that is the last bid plus the difference between the two 
values. 
An important observation is that in the equilibria exhibited in Propositions (1) and (3), or in 
Propositions (2) and (4), the probability of collusion decreases as the number of bidders increases. 
To be more precise, the probability of assigning each object to the bidder with the highest value 
increases as the number of bidders increases. Conditions (3) and (4) are also satisfied by the uniform 
distribution. 
4 Collusive Equilibria with Large Complementarities 
In this section we consider the case of complementarities, i.e. Ui (A U B) > Ui CA) + Ui (B). As 
stated in Section 2, we define udl) = 'Vi, Ui (2) = Wi and Ui ({I, 2}) = Vi + Wi + ki, i = 1,2, and 
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we assume that Vi and Wi are drawn from a symmetric distribution with support [0,1]2, marginal 
density f, and marginal c.dJ. F. We also assume that for each player i = 1,2, the value of the 
complementarity "-i is drawn from a distribution with continuous density 9 and support over an 
interval [.~, kJ. Each random variable "-i is independent of (Vj, Wj, k j ) for each j ::j=. i. 
Finding equilibria for the case in which complementarities are present is complicated by the fact 
that, at any given round of the auction, a bidder's willingness to pay for a given object depends 
on the probability of winning the other object. This destroys the 'belief-free' nature of the SEA 
equilibrium described in Proposition O. We can show however that, if the complementarities are 
commonly known to be 'large', in a sense to be m~de precise, then a result similar to the one found 
in Proposition 0 can be obtained. Define (h := Vi + Wi + "-i, the total value of the bundle for agent 
2. 
Proposition 5 Suppose that there are n players, 2 objects, and 1£ > 1. Then there is a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium with the following outcome: The two objects are allocated to the agent with 
the highest {}i, at a price equal to the second highest valuation (i.e. maxf/=i {}j}. 
The basic intuition here is as follows. Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, if the buyers compete 
on both objects, the auction cannot end with each bidder buying just one object because the value 
for each bidder of owning a second object is higher. Therefore, both players behave as if bidding 
for a single object, the bundle {v, w}. 
The equilibrium of Proposition 5 can be used as a threat to sustain collusive equilibria when large 
complementarities are present. The next proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium 
which yields a supericr expected surplus for both players. Define 
8 v := {(v, w, k) E (0,11 2 X [1£, k] I v > W} 
and 
Proposition 6 There exist two sets Av C 8 v and Aw C 8 w such that the following strategy form 
a PBE: 
• Types (Vi, Wi, k) E [0,1]2 X [1£, k] \Av U Aw open with (0,0) and compete for both objects; 
• Types (Vi, Wi) E Aw open with (0,0) 
• Types (Vi, Wi) E Av open with (0,0) . 
• If the initial bids are {(O, 0) , (0, O)} or {(0, 0) , (0, 0)} then bidders do not place any further 
bid. In all othei' cases, the bidders play the SEA equilibrium described in Proposition 5. 
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• If, at any stage, the bids differ from the ones given above, the bidders play the SEA equilibrium 
described in Proposition 5. 
The set Au and Aw havethe property that if (v, w, k) E Av implies (w, v, k) E Aw and vice-versa. 
The equilibrium of Proposition 6 is a natural generalization of the equilibrium described in 
Proposition (1). The set of types of each bidder is divided into three subsets. The first subset 
consists of those types who cannot be induced to collude. These are the types who have very 
low stand-alone values for each object, and who therefore only value the two objects together. To 
illustrate, suppose that agent 1 is of type (0,0, kl), and define S2 := V2+W2+k2. If 1 accepts to buy 
only one object at price zero, the utility is zero. On the other hand, competing for both objects 
yields a utility equal to Pr (S2 ~ kl ) (kl - E (s21J2 ~ kl )), which is positive, although possibly 
small. It is clear that types like (Cl, c2, k), for Cl and C2 sufficiently small, will also be unwilling to 
collude. 
However, types with a stand-alone value for v sufficiently high are in fact willing to collude. In 
particular assume that bidder 1 has type (VI, W1, k1), with VI > Wl· Define SI := VI + Wl + k l . 
Suppose that at the first round bidder 1 learns that her opponent's type lies in some subset Aw C 
8 w . Then collusion is better than competition if: 
VI ~ 181 (SI - S2) dH (s21(v2, W2, k2) E Aw) (5) 
where H denotes the conditional c.dJ. of S2. In equilibrium, the set Av will be exactly the set of 
those types for whom inequality (5) is satisfied. A similar inequality will define Aw. In equilibrium 
the two sets Av and Aw have to be defined simultaneously. It is intuitive from inequality (5) that 
the two sets will be symmetric. 
The shape of the set Av is roughly as follows. Suppose that bidder 1 has VI ~ Wl. Let us 
summarize the type of agent 1 by the pair (VI, SI), with VI E [0,1] and SI E [l£,2 + k]. Then it 
is clear that if the pair (Vi, si) satisfies inequality (5) then all pairs (Vi, SI) with SI < si will also 
satisfy the inequality. The inequality is also satisfied by the types characterized by the pair (0, k). 
This type has no use for a single object, but is also sure to lose the competition for the two objects. 
Thus, (5) holds with equality. It is also clear that all types characterized by pairs like (VI, VI + k) 
are willing to collude. These are types for whom Wl = 0 and have the lowest possible value for the 
synergy. -If they compete for both objects they pay at least k (the lowest possible value for S2), 
and receive less utility than VI, which is what they would get accepting collusion. In general, for 
a given 'Vl there will be a corresponding value SI (VI) such that types with SI < SI (VI) are willing 
to accepts collusion and types with SI > SI (VI) prefer to compete for both objects rather than to 
accept collusion. The shape of the set Av is thus similar to the one showed in figure 1. 
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One case which is particularly simple and striking is the one in which the extent of the com-
plementarity is known and identical across bidders, i.e. the distribution of ki is degenerate on 
some value k"'. In this case, provided that the condition E (x) ~ ! holds, the strategies proposed in 
proposition 1 are still equilibrium strategies. In other words, the set Av and Aw described in propo-
sition (6) can be taken to be ev and ew respectively, when the complementarities k i are known and 
identical across agents. The intuition is straightforward. If ~ is the same for each bidder, then it 
will be entirely competed away whenever the equilibrium of proposition 5 is triggered.. This makes 
any attempt to get both objects unattractive, hence even types with very low 'stand-alone' values 
can be induced to collude. 
We conclude this section by reconsidering the conjecture according to which collusion decreases 
when complementarities are present. We have shown that the presence of complementarities does 
not destroy collusior.. In fact, we have seen that large complementarities which are known and 
common among the players do not reduce the possibility of collusion at all. What really matters in 
hindering collusion is the variability of the extent of complementarities, rather than their absolute 
values. 
5 Conclusions 
When sequential procedures are used to sell multiple objects, the buyers can collude in order to 
reduce their payments to the seller. The general feature of collusive equilibria in open ascending 
auctions is that each bidder signals to the others which object has the highest value to her. After 
the signaling round, the bidders implicitly promise each other not to compete on the objects that 
they value less, provided they are not challenged on the objects they value more. We have provided 
conditions under which this behavior can be made a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We have also 
shown that at least some degree of collusion may &till be present when the ratio of bidders to objects 
is high, and when there are complementarities in the bidders utility functions. 
As a more general point, the set of equilibria in auctions with mUltiple objects appears to be 
much richer than in the single object case. In this paper, we have shown some of these equilibria. 
It is worth pointing out that in all equilibria in which collusion-via-signallingoccurs it must be the 
case that not too much information is revealed by the equilibrium bidding strategy. To see this, 
suppose, for example, that the bidding strategy were to reveal that one bidder has very low values 
for both objects. Then the other bidder will decide to compete for both objects, i.e. to revert to 
the SEA strategies, since her expected payments onboth objects will be low. A bidder with high 
values will accept a collusive outcome only if the information revealed is such that her expected 
14 
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payment in open competition is sufficiently high. But this must imply that there is always some 
pooling among low and high values. This in turn implies that in general collusion-vi a-signalling 
not only reduces the revenue to the seller, but also reduces the efficiency of the final allocation. 
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Appendix 
Propositions 1 and 2 are special cases, with z = 0, of Propositions 3 and 4 respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the symmetry of the problem, it is enough to check the 
optimality of the strategy for types having Vi 2: Wi. We will do this proceeding backward. 
Consider the first round at which only two agents remain, say 1 and 2. Suppose that bidder 1 has 
VI 2: WI and opened at round zero with (0,0) , while bidder 2 opened with (0,0). Suppose also that 
the outstanding pair of bids at round t - 1 was (z, z) . Let Fv (V2! Lz ) and Fw (V2! Lz ) denote the 
c.dJ. of V2 and W2 respectively, both conditional on the set Lz := { (V2' W2) E [O,lf I z ~ V2 ~ W2} . 
If bidder 1 changes her bids, then the SEA strategies are triggered. The expected utility in this 
case is: 
and we have to check that the deviation is unprofitable, that is: 
for each pair (VI, wd such that VI 2: WI. Since S (VI, WI I Lz) is increasing in Wl, it is enough to 
check the inequality for the types on the diagonal, i.e. types such that VI = WI. Defining: 
the inequali ties to be checked are: 
VI - z 2: IZ (VI)' for each VI E [z, 11. 
"Ve start by noting that this holds at VI = z, since both sides are zero; and then observe that the 
derivative of the LHS with respect to VI is 1, while the RHS derivative 
I~ (VI) = l VI dFv (V21 Lz ) + l VI dFw (W21 Lz ), 
is zero at VI = z, and increasing, hence positive for each VI E (z, 1J. Thus the function IZ (VI) is 
convex, and we are done if we can prove that 
1 - z 2: IZ (1) . 
This can be rewritten as: 
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or, using the symmetry of the joint distribution of V2 and W2, as 
(6) 
where Uz := {(v2, W2) E [0,1]2 I Z :::; w2 :::; V2} . By symmetry, we have ~ = Pr (Lz I z :::; V2, Z :::; 1(2) = 
Pr(Uz I z:::; V2,Z:::; W2), hence 
Independence of V2 and W2 implies E [v21 z s V2, z S W2! = E [v21 Z :::; V2], so that condition 6 can 
be written as: 
1 
E (v2l z :::; V2, z :::; W2) ~ 2 (1 + z) • 
This is the condition stated in the theorem, and we can therefore conclude that the agents will 
collude when the opportunity arises. 
The optimality of the strategies when more than two agents are left follows from the fact that 
any other strategy simply destroys the opportunity of collusion should it arise, and does not improve 
the outcOme otherwise. 
The only thing which is left to show is that at the opening a player is willing to signal truthfully 
the triangle in which her type is. This is going to matter only when the player ends up being one of 
the two last players and both players are competing for both objects. We show that for any given 
z at which. this may happen it is better to have announced the correct triangle at date O. 
If bidder 1 announces the correct triangle, then the expected payoff conditional on being one of 
the two last bidders, and on z being the last bid for both bidders, is: 
1 1 2 (VI - z) + 2 S (VI, WI I Lz ) (7) 
This is because, given the symmetry in the distributions of Vi and Wi for each i, with probability ~ 
the opponent is of type W2 ~ V2, so that her initial bid is (0,0), and with probability! the opponent 
is of type V2 ~ W2. In the first case the auction ends immediately, yielding a payoff VI - z, while in 
the second case bidders go on playing the SEA equilibrium. 
If the bidder opens with (0,0) then the expected payoff conditional on being one of the two last 
players and both having valuation at least z for both objects is: 
1 1 2 (Wl - z) + 2 S (Vb wl I Uz ) (8) 
(notice that now S i~ conditional to V2 ~ W2 rather than to V2 :::; W2). The expression in (8) does 
not exceed the one in (7) if 
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which holds with equality if VI = WI. Moreover, the derivatives with respect to VI are 
for the LHS, and 
for the RHS. Hence the LHS grows faster than the RHS as VI is increased, thus implying that the 
inequality holds for each VI > WI. • 
Proof of Proposition 4. Again, because of symmetry it suffices to check the optimality of the 
strategy along the equilibrium path for a bidder whose type is in the 'lower triangle.' We proceed 
backward. 
Suppose first that only two players are left, say 1 and 2. If 1 opened with (0, 0) and 2 opened with 
(0,0) , then the analysis of Proposition (3) applies, since condition (3) implies E (x Iz ~ x ~ 1) 2: 
{1 + z) /2 for a = 0, hence deviating to the SEA strategy is not profitable. If both bidders have 
opened with (0,0), then we have to show that bidder 1 with type VI - WI = al is willing to raise 
the bid on the first object only if she is not assigned object V and the outstanding bid is (p, z) with 
p < z + al. There are two possible deviations from the equilibrium path: 
1) Stop bidding on v, and raise the bid on W by a small amount if necessary, i.e. if 1 is not currently 
assigned w. This deviation yields at most WI - z. Define 
The set Tz (p) is the support of bidder l's beliefs about 2's values conditional on the last round's 
bids being (p, z) for each bidder. The expected utility from following the equilibrium strategy is: 
U· (VI, wIITz (p» = Pr {a2 ~ all Tz (P)} (VI - Z - E (a21 a2 ~ aI, Tz (p») 
+ Pr {a2 2: al I Tz (P)} (WI - z) , 
which can be written as: 
It is clear that the last expression higher than 'tUI - z. 
2) Raise the bid on w, without stopping the bidding on v. In this case, the SEA equilibrium is 
triggered and we have to verify that: 
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It is enough to check the inequality at p = z + al. Triggering the SEA equilibrium before preaches 
that level can only do worse. 
Using VI = WI + aI, the relevant inequality to be checked. is therefore: 
The inequality is satisfied at WI = z and the RHS is increasing and convex. Applying the same 
reasoning as in Proposition (3) we conclude that it is enough to check the inequality: 
where use is made of the fact that the highest possible value for WI when VI - WI ~ al is 1 - al. 
The inequality is equivalent to: 
or: 
E (xl x ~ a + y, 1 - a ~ y ~ z) + E (xl y - a ~ x ~ z, y ~ a + z) ~ 1 + z 
which is the condition stated in the Proposition. 
At last, we check that a bidder wants to stop after the other bidder has stopped the bidding, 
rather than competing for both objects. Suppose that the bidder has VI - Wl = a and the other 
bidder stopped. at z + at with at :$ a. In this case define: 
Then the inequality becomes: 
Using WI = VI - a we can rewrite the inequality as: 
Again, the inequality is satisfied. at VI = z + a, the RHS is increasing and convex and we have only 
to check: 
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In order to compute the integrals observe: 
, ) {F(X-a')-F(Z) of > + ' 
= Pr(x-a ~ W2 ~ z = F(l-a')-F(z) 1 X _ Z a 
Pr (1 - a' ~ W2 ~ z) 0 otherwise 
Therefore: 
if V2 ~ z + a' 
otherwise 
Similar computations lead to: 
if 1 - a' ~ W2 ~ z 
otherwise 
We therefore have: 
and 
J:,+z v2/ (V2 - a') dV2 = Jzl-a' (y + a') f (y) dy = E (x Iz < x < 1 _ a') + a' 
F(l- a') - F(z) F(l- a') - F(z) - -
Similarly, we have: 
r1- a _ t-a (1 - a - W2) f (W2 + a') dW2 
}z (1-a- w2)dFw (w21 0 a',z)= z 1-F(z+a') 
F(l- (a - a')) - F(a' + z) J:- a w2/(W2 + a') dW2 
- (1 a) - ~----:----.--
- - 1-F(a'+z) 1-F(z+a') 
and 
Jzl-a w2/ (W2 + a') dW2 _ fzl;~,a-a') (y - a') f (y) dy 
1 - F (z + a') - 1 - F (z + a') 
Jzl;~~-a') (y - a') f (y) dy Jzl+a' yf (y) dy 
.:c..:;...:-"'-______ = - a 
1-F(z+a') 1-F(z+a) 
-
Combining these results we obtain the following condition: 
1 - a' - z ~ 1 - E (x I z ~ x ~ 1 - a') - a' 
( ) F (1 - (a - a')) - F(a' + z) fzl-a W2! (W2 + a') dW2 + 1 - a - -'-"----:::-:---.--
1 - F (a' + z) 1 - F (z + a') 
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The inequality has to hold for each a ~ a'. Noticing that the RHS is decreasing in a, the relevant 
condition is obtained setting a = a'. This yields: 
E (x Iz S; x S; 1 - a) + E (x Iz + a S; x S; 1) 2 1 + z 
which is the condition stated in the Proposition. 
The argument for optimality when more than three bidders are active is identical to the one of 
Proposition (3): there is no point in triggering the SEA strategies at the opening, since the decision 
can always be taken later. 
The only thing that remain to be proved is that it is convenient to open in the 'true' triangle. 
Possible deviations in this case are opening in the 'wrong' triangle or opening bidding on both 
objects, thus triggering the SEA equilibrium. The initial bid is only relevant if the bidder ends up 
among the two last bidders. We will show that for every z, and conditional on being one of the two 
last bidders, opening in the 'true' triangle gives a higher expected utility than any deviation. 
The expected utility conditional on being one of the two remaining bidders at z for a type 
(VI, WI) such that VI - WI = al ~ 0 is: 
U(O,0) = ~Vl + ~ (Wl + Pr (a2 S; al)(al - E(a21a2 S; ad)) - z (9) 
where a2 = V2 - W2 and the probability distribution is conditional to V2 2 Z, W2 ~ z. This is because 
with probability! the other bidder has opened in the upper triangle, so that the auction ends and 
1 obtains VI at price z, while with probability ~ the other bidder opens in the lower triangle. In 
the latter case the bidder pays at least z and obtains at least Wl It additionally obtains al minus 
the price when the auction is won. Triggering the SEA equilibrium with an opening other than 
(0,0) or (0,0) is obviously dominated, since the SEA equilibrium can be triggered later at no cost. 
We have therefore only to check that it is not convenient to open in the wrong triangle. 
Suppose 1 opens bidding (0, 0), i.e. signaling the 'wrong' triangle. If the other bidder also opens 
with (0,0) then the best strategy is to pretend to have al = 0 and get V for z. This is clearly better 
than getting 'W for a price greater than z. The other possibility is to trigger the SEA strategies: To 
show that this cannot be optimal we have to check the inequality: 
Under the assumptions stated in the Proposition the inequality is satisfied (The analysis is the 
same as before). 
If the other bidder opens with (0,0) then any attempt to compete on good V triggers the SEA 
equilibrium. The payoff in this case is therefore whatever is best between obtaining Wl at z and 
triggering the SEA equilibrium, that is max {Wl - Z, S (VI, wll Uz )}. We therefore conclude that 
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the expected payoff, conditional on being one of the two players left at z, when the opening is in 
the wrong triangle is: 
(10) 
If WI - Z ;::: S (VI, Wll Uz ) then this is clearly less that the utility obtained in equilibrium. If 
Wl - z < S (VI, wll Uz ) the condition that the deviation be not profitable, that is (9) is greater than 
(10), can be written as: 
which is satisfied under the conditions stated in the Proposition because it is equivalent to the 
condition that it is optimal to follow the equilibrium strategy after opening in the 'true' triangle . 
• 
Proof of Proposition 5 . The following is a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium yielding the 
desired outcome. The convention is that bids are a pair, with the first element referring to v. 
• Open bidding (1,0) . 
• If the outstanding bids (bv , bw ) are such that bv + bw < Vj + Wj + k j then keep the bid on V 
fixed and keep raising the bid on w. 
• If the outstanding bids ("bv, bw) are such that bv + bw ;::: Vj + Wj + kj then: 
- Bid only on V if vi > bv , W ::; bw • 
- Bid only on W if vi ::; bv , W > bw . 
- Stop bidding otherwise. 
• If at any point an agent makes an out of equilibrium bid then all the other agents believe 
that she is type (1,1, k) and they bid very high for both objects, confident that they don't 
have to pay. 
It is clear that the out of equilibrium strategies are optimal given the beliefs. We have to check 
optimality along the equilibrium path. Given the opening bid, it is clear that it is impossible to 
buy v for less than 1. Also, Vi ::; bv from that point on Therefore no agent will raise the bid on 
v, and each agent i will raise the bid on W up to Vi + Wi + ~ - 1. Any deviation gives zero utility, 




Proof of Proposition 6. Using the arguments of Proposition 5 we have that the strategies 
described in the last point of the Proposition constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium at any 
given stage. We are left with the task of finding the appropriate sets Av, Aw, show that the 
prescribed strategy is optimal for all types at stage 0, and that for types in Av, Aw it is optimal to 
stop bidding when the initial bids are «0,0) , (0,0)) or ((0,0) , (0,0)). 
Let 
et! = {(v, w, k)1 v E [0,1]' wE [0, v], k E [1£, k]} 
and 
ew = {(v,w,k)lv E [O,w] ,w E [0, 1J ,k E (k,k]}. 
Define s == v + w + k, and let H (s) be the c.d.f. on s, that is: 
H (x) = Pr {v + w + k :5 x} 
Given our assumption on the support of v, wand k it is clear that H (~) = ° and H (2 + k) = 1. 
Furthermore, given the symmetry of (v, w) and the independence of the distributions of v, w, k we 
have that H (si ev ) = H (si ew ). Define the sets A~ = 8 v , A~ = 8 w , and define: 
A~ = {(V,W,k) E 8 wlw ~ lV+WH (v+w+k-S)dH(~181J)} 
Thus, A~ is the set of types in 8 v who prefer to have v for free rather than competing for the 
bundle when it is known that the type of the other agent lies in 8 w A symmetric interpretation 
holds for ~. Observe that the sets A! and A~ are compact and connected. 
It is clear that the two sets are symmetric, meaning that if (a, b, c) E ~ then (b,c,a) E ~ 
Furthermore, it is also clear that H (si A~) = H (si A~). Now, given two symmetric sets A~ and 
A!;, with the property that H (si A!;,) = H (si A~) define the sets: 
{ r+wH } A~+l= (v,w,k}Eevlv~ Jk (v+w+k-s)dH(sIA~) 
{ r~H } ~+l= (v,w,k}E8wlw~ Jk (v+w+k-s}dH(sIA~) 
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If A~ and A~ are compact and connected then A~+I and ~+1 are also compact and connected. 
We claim that the sequence {A~} has a converging subsequence, and that the set Av to which the 
subsequence converges is the set we are looking for. 
Let H (8v ) be the set of non-empty compact subsets of 8 v . For a given set F E H (8v ) define 
the set: 
Be (F) = {y E 8 v Ily - xl < c for some x E F} 
The space H (8v ) is a metric space when endowed with the Hausdorff distance: 
p(F, G) = min{c > OIF c Be (G) and G c Be (F)} 
Since the set 8 v is compact, the set H (8v ) is also compact (see e.g. Mas Colell (1985), Proposition 
A.5.l). The sequence {~} is a sequence of elements in H (8v ), and since the set is compact there 
exists a converging subsequence. Let Av be the element to which the subsequence converge, and 
observe that since all elements in {A~} are connected then A is connected too (see e.g. Mas Colell 
(1985), Proposition A.5.1). The set Aw can be obtained using exactly the same procedure. 
The sets Av and Aw satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Observe first that for each sand n we 




Consider now that a type (v, w, k) E Av. The equilibrium strategy prescribes: 
1. Open with (0,0). 
2. If the other bidder opens with (0,0) then stop bidding. In all other cases, use the SEA 
strategy. 
Let us first check that the strategy after op~ning with (0,0) and observing (0,0). The only 
possible deviation is to trigger the SEA equilibrium, which yields: 
l vl+wl+k S ( VI, WI, kl Aw) = !i (VI + WI + k - s) dH ( si Aw) 
Using (11) and the fact that (VI, WI, k) E Av we obta,in: 
We now check optimality at stage O. It clearly makes no sense to trigger the SEA strategy. The 
only other possible deviation is to bid (0,0), thus signalling that the type belongs to Aw. It is not 
profitable to use the SEA equilibrium after the other type signals Av, since this is equivalent to 
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triggering directly the SEA equilibrium with probability 1, which we know not to be profitable. 
Suppose now that collusion is accepted. Then we compare the expected utility of the deviation: 
with the expected utility of the equilibrium strategy: 
But now observe that the symmetry of Av and Aw implies Pr (Av) = Pr (Aw) and: 
Since VI ~ Wl we conclude that the deviation is not profitable. 
A symmetric reasoning shows that types (VI, Wl, k1) rt. Av U Aware not. better off announcing 
(0,0) or (0,0). In this case the agent is going to trigger the SEA strategy no matter what the 
announcement of the other agent is, so that announcing (0, 0) and triggering the SEA equilibrium 
from the very beginning is optimal. • 
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